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European Air Transport Public





The ‘Third Package’ of European Union air transport liberalisation measures
came into effect on 1 January 1993 and has substantially reduced the restrictions
on interstate flight operations. The package of measures also includes provision
for the member states to impose ‘public service obligations’ on low-density
routes which were deemed necessary for the purposes of regional development.
In this paper, it is this legislation which is the main focus of attention. In the
second section, the background to and contents of the ‘Third Package’ are
reviewed. The competitive implications of these measures are briefly outlined. In
Section III, the legislation relating to public service obligation routes is critically
examined. The Irish government was first to invoke this legislation and several
difficulties have come to light as a result. In the final section, recommendations
on improvements to the legislation are proposed, based largely on the equivalent
US ‘Essential Air Services’ (EAS) programme.
II. EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT LIBERALISATION
1. The EU ‘Third Package’ of Air Transport Liberalisation Measures
The European Union took substantial steps towards liberalising the internal
European air transport market in July 1992 with the adoption of Council
Regulations no. L240 relating to several key aspects of the industry’s operation
including access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes,
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licensing and fares. This package of measures, commonly referred to as the
‘Third Package’ of measures, represented a substantial step forward in the
process of achieving a single market in the air transport sector. Previous
packages (the First Package of 1987 and Second Package of 1989) represented
more modest moves to liberalisation, although, as Button and Swann (1992)
show, the application of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (relating to
antitrust-type restrictions) to air transport in 1987 represented major progress on
what had been a long slow process (Crowley, 1992; McGowan and Seabright,
1989; McGowan, 1994). Button and Swann give a very comprehensive review of
this process and carefully analyse factors that led to the adoption of the ‘Third
Package’. Several of the negative outcomes associated with deregulation in the
US are subject to safeguard provisions in the European liberalisation programme
(i.e. computer reservation system ownership and bias, predatory pricing
practices, slot allocation issues relating to hub airport dominance) (Van De
Voorde, 1992; Button and Swann, 1992).
Council Regulations no. 2407/92 through 2411/92 cover a wide range of
issues in the scheduled and non-scheduled passenger and cargo markets. Council
Regulation no. 2407/92 deals with common licensing arrangements and the
rights of Community-registered carriers to operate any aircraft owned within the
Community. The licensing regulation requires that the principal place of
business and registered office be located in the state in which the carrier is
registered, that the carrier carries insurance and that air transport is the main
concern of the licensee. Licensed carriers are not required to own their own
aircraft, but they must have at least one at their disposal. These aircraft must be
registered in the state’s aircraft register, although it is left to the discretion of the
member state to issue a licence to the carrier if the aircraft at their disposal are
registered elsewhere in the EU.
Council Regulation no. 2408/92 covers access to intra-Community air routes.
This includes the abolition of capacity restrictions between member states and
the removal of restrictions concerning fifth-freedom and multiple designation
rights
2 along with a gradual phasing-in of cabotage
3 rights. Full cabotage is not
required before April 1997. Consecutive cabotage is permitted where a carrier
uses less than 50 per cent of its seasonal capacity on a service on which the
cabotage segment is an extension or preliminary to an interstate route. This
regulation also makes provision for the imposition of public service obligations
and permits entry to be restricted on new routes between regional airports (these
aspects are discussed in detail in the next subsection). Provision is made for
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member states to establish non- discriminatory rules for distributing air traffic
between airports within an airport system (e.g. the London or Paris airport
systems).
Council Regulation no. 2409/92 grants freedom for Community carriers to set
air fares and rates for services, except in specific limited circumstances. In
Council Regulation no. 2410/92, the Community competition rules are formally
extended to the air transport sector, while amendments to certain categories of
agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector are made in
Council Regulation no. 2411/92.
2. Public Service Obligations in EU Air Transport
Under Council Regulation no. 2408/92, the Council of Ministers adopted a
regulation permitting the imposition of a public service obligation (PSO) in
respect of scheduled air services. These PSOs are defined as
any obligation imposed upon an air carrier to take, in respect of any route which it is
licensed to operate by a Member State, all necessary measures to ensure the provision of a
service satisfying fixed standards of continuity, regularity, capacity and pricing, which
standards the air carrier would not assume if it were solely considering its commercial
interests.
(Official Journal of the European Communities, no. L240/10, 23 July 1992.)
The PSOs may be imposed by member states in relation to scheduled air services
to an airport serving a peripheral or development region in its territory, or on a thin route to
any regional airport in its territory, any such route being considered vital for the economic
development of the region in which the airport is located, to the extent necessary to ensure
on that route the adequate provision of scheduled air services satisfying fixed standards of
continuity, regularity, capacity and pricing, which standards air carriers would not assume
if they were solely considering their commercial interest.
(Official Journal of the European Communities, no. L240/10, 23 July 1992.)
It is only in this paragraph that the PSO is mentioned in relation to an airport. In
all other references, the PSOs are expressed in terms of routes. The regulation
requires that the right to operate such PSOs be offered by public tender either
singly or for a group of routes to any licensed Community carrier. The selected
carrier is permitted to offer only passenger services under a PSO order, and fares
and conditions may be quoted to the selected carrier. In the event of no carrier
being willing to offer the required level of services, the regulation allowsFiscal Studies
62
member states to pay compensation
4 and to limit access to the route to just one
carrier for up to three years. In setting out an invitation to tender for the PSO,
5
the member state is required to state the necessary standards of the order, rules
for amending or terminating the contract and penalties for failure to comply with
the contract. The member state must demonstrate to the Commission that other
forms of transport cannot adequately ensure service when capacity offered
exceeds 30,000 seats per year (this amounts to just over 80 seats per day and is a
very low threshold). Other member states may propose satisfactory alternatives
fulfilling the same PSO.
The Council did not put any financial instrument in place, nor were specific
guidelines set out for the operation of such a programme. Compensation paid to
carriers under these PSOs is to come from the individual state concerned. This
regulation related to new Community PSOs coming into effect after 1 January
1993. In trying to assess the extent of pre-existing subsidy payments by member
states to carriers for air service obligations, the Commission prepared a report
for the Council and European Parliament, On the Evaluation of Aid Schemes
Established in Favour of Community Air Carriers, in March 1992. In this report,
it was shown that Greece, France, Italy and the UK were operating some system
of direct operational aids to carriers for service on domestic routes. The detail
and extent of these subsidies were not fully documented as this information was
not forthcoming in many instances from the state governments. Some specific
examples are quoted in the report, however.
III. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PSO LEGISLATION
1. Irish Invocation of Article 4 of Council Regulation no. 2408/92
The Irish government is the first European state to invoke Article 4 of Council
Regulation no. 2408/92, relating to the PSOs. Seven PSOs were imposed on
domestic routes to the six regional airports in 1994 (i.e. six air routes between
each of the regional airports and Dublin and, in addition, one route connecting
three of the regional airports). The six airports, which opened for scheduled
international air services between 1986 and 1989, experienced rapid increases in
passenger volumes up to 1990 (477 per cent increase overall between 1987 and
1990) and very dramatic declines between 1990 and 1993 (51 per cent decline
from 1990 to 1993). This pattern emerged for a variety of reasons which are
discussed at length in Reynolds-Feighan (1993; 1995). With the decline in traffic
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in each successive year since 1990, many of the airports, which are privately
owned, face serious financial difficulties and even bankruptcy. Service to four of
the airports has been reduced to one early-afternoon round trip per day. This
makes connections difficult for many passengers and imposes additional travel
time costs on business flyers who must stay overnight in the region or in the
destination location because of the minimal frequency offered.
The potential benefit of air transport links to several peripheral regions of
Ireland is reduced or lost when air services are withdrawn or reduced to a
skeleton service. The Irish government invested almost IR£25 million ($37.5
million) in these airports using exchequer funds and the European Union
Structural Funds. These investments were made because it was felt that the
airports were a vital component of the transport infrastructure in the regions and
would contribute to regional economic development (Irish Department of
Transport, Energy and Communications, 1994). However, the airports can only
contribute to regional economic development if they have regular and convenient
air services offered by air carriers. Ireland’s two airlines, Ryanair and Aer
Lingus, substantially reduced their schedules to the six regional airports in 1991
and 1992. The skeleton service remaining is forcing many potential passengers
to drive long distances to the main Irish airport at Dublin to avail of service. The
potential advantages of the airports to the communities are not being realised.
That the provision of a basic level of transport services is a prerequisite for
long-term sustainable economic development was the argument that formed the
basis for the Irish government’s decision to invoke Article 4 of Council
Regulation no. 2408/92 and impose public service obligations. The PSO orders
set out guideline timetables for connecting flights at Dublin, minimum
frequencies required, categories of aircraft to be utilised and a maximum return
fare.
6 Since no applications were received by carriers willing to enter the markets
and provide the required services, the Irish government published an invitation to
tender for the routes and an undertaking to limit access to one carrier on these
routes in mid-1994.
7 The Irish invocation of this regulation has highlighted
several key difficulties associated with the EU PSO programme. These will be
outlined and discussed below. Before doing this, however, a brief outline of the
equivalent US legislation is given, since comparisons will be drawn between the
EU and US programmes.
2. US Essential Air Services Programme
The US trunk carriers that were in existence when the industry was first
regulated in 1938 received subsidy payments for the carriage of mail on a variety
of short/medium-haul routes. As larger aircraft were being used and the trunks
entered longer-haul routes, subsidy payments were reduced. In the 1950s,
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subsidies were no longer required by the trunks. The US government was eager
to develop the air transport system and particularly air services to smaller
communities. Accordingly, it issued certificates to a new class of air carrier, the
local service carriers, in the 1940s (Eads, 1972; Molloy, 1985). These carriers
were not permitted to compete with the trunks and were restricted to serve short-
haul/low-density routes. Subsidies were paid by the federal government and the
Post Office to develop these routes. Throughout the 1950s, the subsidy payments
were rising steadily as the local service carriers moved towards using larger
aircraft. In an effort to reduce the payments, the Civil Aeronautics Board
permitted route restructuring in the mid- 1960s and a large number of small
community services were abandoned by the local service carriers. Subsidy
payments fell, however. This policy was reversed in the early 1970s when a
route moratorium was imposed. Once again, the subsidy payments began to rise
as many operators were using small jet aircraft on routes with market
characteristics more suitable for smaller turbo-prop equipment. The subsidy
payments during this period were based on the overall financial position of the
carrier rather than being prorated with output (US Office of Technology
Assessment, 1982).
FIGURE 1
US Federal Air Subsidy Payments, 1955-93
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The industry was deregulated in 1978, with the ‘section 406’ payments (i.e.
the pre-1978 subsidies authorised under section 406 of the 1958 Federal
Aviation Act) being phased out by 1983. The ‘Essential Air Services’ (EAS)
programme was established under section 419 of the 1978 Airline Deregulation
Act and permitted commuter carriers to avail of subsidies for service to small
communities. The commuter carriers were non-certificated and had been
permitted to start up in the 1950s on an experimental basis. They gradually
began replacing trunk carriers and local service carriers on the short-haul routes
that were being abandoned in the 1950s and 1960s. Prior to 1978, commuter
carriers were not eligible to receive federal subsidies for services to small
communities. In the 1978 act, this restriction was removed and the act required
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the regulatory agency at the time, to draw
up common safety, technical and operating standards for commuter carriers. The
aim was to assure the travelling public that safety standards that prevailed for the
certificated carriers (i.e. trunk and local service carriers holding a (federal)
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity) would now be applicable to the
commuter carriers. Since 1978, the number of commuter carriers operating has
expanded rapidly and the EAS programme is now largely serviced by these
commuter carriers. As Figure 1 shows, the subsidy payments have been
maintained in the 1980s at significantly lower levels than those prevailing in the
1960s and 1970s.
The EAS programme is now administered by the US Department of
Transportation (DOT) and continues to be funded by the federal government.
The programme operates in the following way.
8 Eligible communities/points
were identified as those communities receiving scheduled air services in October
1978 (when the Airline Deregulation Act was passed). Several restrictions have
been introduced in the last two years to reduce the number of new communities
qualifying for the programme. These restrictions relate to the relative location of
the community vis-à-vis larger regional and national ‘hub’ airports. The
Secretary of Transportation determines the level of essential air service for each
community (usually two round trips per day, six days per week) (US Department
of Transportation, 1992). If this service is not being provided by a carrier, the
DOT invites applications from carriers to tender for the service provision and
specify if necessary the level of compensation required to fulfil the required air
service level. One carrier is selected by the DOT based on several factors
including fare structure, reliability of the carrier and interlining and/or marketing
arrangements with larger carriers at the hub airport that the applicant carrier
proposes to use. The DOT issues an order naming the carrier, the level of
compensation payable and the period covered by the agreement. The carrier may,
with the DOT’s permission, enhance the service offered, provided that it is co-
                                                                                                                                   
8 See Reynolds-Feighan (1995) for lengthy discussion of the US programme.Fiscal Studies
66
sponsored by the community or state and that the increased service will result in
self-sufficiency for the community within three years.
If another carrier at any time proposes to offer subsidy-free service to an EAS
community where compensation is being paid to a carrier, the DOT may give
notice to the incumbent carrier of its intention to discontinue the subsidy
payments and the service obligation with that carrier. The new carrier may offer
service covering the minimum service level. The incumbent carrier may choose
to continue service without compensation on the route or to withdraw its service.
If one carrier remains serving the community, it cannot withdraw service without
notice to the DOT and until a replacement carrier is found. A single carrier
operating to an EAS community is obliged to meet the designated minimum
service level.
In summary, the US programme involves designating eligible points
(communities) rather than routes. Because it is federally operated, consistent
qualifying criteria, service level designations and tendering procedures and
selections result. In addition, the procedure for dealing with increased air service
levels is clearly set out. Through the competitive bidding process and the threat
of replacement for a subsidised carrier by a low-cost carrier, total subsidy
payments are kept in check. In the last two years, additional restrictions have
been set out for new communities entering the programme in an effort to keep
the total federal subsidy payments within the limits agreed by Congress. These
restrictions relate to the distance to the next nearest commercial airport and the
maximum subsidy allowable per passenger.
3. Difficulties with the EU PSO Regulation
The difficulties with the EU PSO regulation cover three main areas — namely,
state-level operation of PSOs rather than EU operation, entry protection and
cabotage restrictions, and implications of curtailment of the commuter carrier
sector. These will be discussed in turn below.
National versus EU Operation of PSOs
The European PSO regulation leaves the administration and funding of these
orders to the individual states. The EU has not set out criteria for designating
PSO routes, nor has it set out procedures for selecting among applicant carriers;
this is left to the individual states. Consistent designations of PSO routes and
service levels as well as EU funding for the programme would lead to a more
efficient and more transparent programme, with better matching of funds to
regional needs (see Reynolds-Feighan (1995) for a lengthy discussion). In the
report by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
mentioned earlier (CEC, 1992), it was pointed out that several routes receiving
state subsidies within the Community should have been commercially viable
based on the route characteristics. Consistent assessment of PSO routes at theEuropean Air Transport PSOs
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Commission level would prevent this situation arising in the future. In the House
of Commons Transport Committee report of 1991, fear was expressed that the
PSOs could be used by member states to support the state-owned airlines.
The EU regulation is unclear about the payment of compensation for
enhanced or increased air service levels (above the level required by the PSO).
The Irish regional airports were adversely affected by the cyclical downturn in
the air transport sector and by the recession in the Irish and UK economies
particularly. If the demand for air services increases periodically as expected, is
it the case that the state governments may increase the levels of subsidy
payments, or do subsidies just apply to the minimum service level?
Entry Protection and Cabotage Restrictions
The EU regulation explicitly permits the member states imposing the PSO to
restrict entry to the route to one carrier for a period of up to three years. This
contrasts with the US EAS programme which permits another carrier to bid to
offer replacement services for a lower level of compensation or for no
compensation. This possibility of entry, or in fact replacement of an incumbent
carrier, keeps costs as low as possible and minimises subsidy payments by the
federal government. The federal government has learned from 50 years of
regulating the domestic airline industry that restricting entry to routes results in
federal subsidy payments rising and inefficiency developing. This case was
outlined earlier.
Under the European programme, selected carriers receive protection from
entry by other carriers for a period of up to three years from the commencement
of the PSO (Article 4.1(d) of Council Regulation no. 2408/92). This procedure
does not allow flexibility. For the smaller regional airports in both Ireland and
the UK, an examination of recent traffic trends demonstrates that they were more
sensitive to unfavourable economic conditions than were the larger airports.
These smaller airports (with between 40,000 and 200,000 passenger throughputs
per annum) experienced very dramatic changes in traffic volumes in a two-year
period (Reynolds-Feighan, 1994). The rigidity of the European PSO procedure
hampers expansion of services by the designated carrier and prevents entry by
another carrier for periods when economic conditions may increase demand for
the air services. Under the US programme, the (subsidised) carrier does not
receive protection from entry by other carriers, since the main function of the US
programme is to provide a safety net for small communities by ensuring that air
service levels do not fall below a specified minimum level. In the event of
improved demand for services, other carriers are free to enter the market at any
time or to offer to provide the minimum service level for a lower level of
compensation. Exit by a carrier from a route is permitted when at least one other
carrier services the route. Exit is not permitted, however, if no other carrierFiscal Studies
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services the route. Under these circumstances, the carrier is paid a higher subsidy
by the DOT and a replacement carrier is sought.
Because of the phased introduction of cabotage in the EU, carriers registered
in the state imposing the PSO have an advantage over non-national carriers. This
arises because of the capacity restriction placed on the latter carriers by the
‘consecutive-cabotage’ rule, i.e.
a Member State shall not be required to authorize cabotage traffic rights within its territory
by Community air carriers licensed by another Member State, unless ... the air carrier does
not use, for the cabotage service, more than 50% of its seasonal capacity on the same
service of which the cabotage service constitutes the extension or the preliminary
(Article 3 of Council Regulation no. 2408/92.)
This restriction and the fact that routes are specified by the individual states
mean that cross-border PSO routes are less likely. The expansion of existing
regional or commuter carriers across borders is also curtailed until 1997 at least
by the consecutive-cabotage rule. The House of Commons Transport Committee
report of 1991 called for clear guidelines to be set out for the terms of tenders,
because under the current legislation, the committee was concerned that member
states could use ‘their discretion with respect to the selection criteria to favour
particular airlines’ (House of Commons Transport Committee, 1991). The
consecutive- cabotage rule compounds this.
FIGURE 2
US Commuter Airline Traffic, 1970-93
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The US EAS programme is administered by the DOT and places no
restrictions on licensed carriers tendering for EAS routes. This allows for a
minimum-cost operator to be selected and this in turn minimises the subsidy
payments required.
9 Free entry to and exit from routes is seen to be a key
component in the development of competitive and efficient air transport markets
(Baumol, 1982; Barrett, 1991; Comitédes Sages, 1994).
Curtailment of Growth of the Commuter Carrier Sector
The restriction of entry to PSO routes, the consecutive-cabotage rule and the
state- level administration and funding of PSOs are likely to curtail the
development of commuter airlines in Europe. Article 5 of Council Regulation no.
2408/92 aims to encourage the development of new routes between regional
airports by allowing state governments to limit the number of carriers on these
new routes to one. Because these routes are likely to have relatively low volumes
of traffic and operate over relatively short distances, the initial development of
the routes should be driven by commuter carriers operating turbo-prop aircraft.
The consecutive- cabotage rule will hinder the development of new cross-border
routes and delay until at least 1997 the efficient organisation and growth of
‘third-level’ carriers and their networks. The EU needs to reconsider the role of
inter-regional air routes, however, and take the lead on encouraging route
developments at the federal level.
In the US, the commuter carriers have maintained strong and consistent
growth in passenger volumes since 1978, as Figure 2 demonstrates. These
carriers provide vital links between small centres and the main regional and
national nodes of the air transport system. The EAS programme is now largely
serviced by the commuter carriers (in 1994, 419 of the 503 eligible communities
were served exclusively by regional/commuter carriers (Regional Airline
Association, 1994)). These carriers have expanded the size of their operations
and the links with the larger major and national carriers. As was shown earlier,
the EAS programme has rationalised federal subsidy payments to small
communities and ensured federal safety regulations for the commuter carriers.
The commuter carriers have increased the number of enplaned passengers by 378
per cent between 1978 and 1993. The number of operators has declined from 228
carriers in 1978 to 196 in 1983 and 130 in 1993, through mergers, acquisitions
and a small number of failures. The result has been a steady rise in the average
fleet size of the carriers. These trends are illustrated in Figure 3. The total
number of commuter aircraft in operation in 1978 was 1,047; this rose to 1,545
in 1983 and to 2,208 in 1993 (Regional Airline Association, 1988–94). The
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average number of aircraft operated by a commuter carrier is now 17 (1993), a
substantial increase since 1978 when the average fleet was 4.6 aircraft.
FIGURE 3
US Commuter Airline Fleet Characteristics, 1978-93
Source: Regional Airline Association, 1988-94.
In Table 1, information on the number of commuter, charter and air taxi
operators in each state of the EU in 1993 is presented. The data are derived from
the 1994 edition of JP Airline Fleet International. It should be noted that these
data are estimates based on the compilations in the publication, but the source
does not clearly distinguish commuter airlines and air taxi operators from other
users of turbo-prop aircraft in all cases.
10 Table 1 shows that the EU commuter
carriers and air taxi operators are large in number and small in terms of their
average fleet size. The overall average number of aircraft per carrier is 3.4 for
the EU. A very large number of operators utilise a single aircraft each. These
carriers typically service short-haul low-density routes on a scheduled, non-
scheduled or air taxi service basis. In the single internal EU market, these
carriers have the potential to offer flexible access and mobility to small
communities by linking small centres or rural/peripheral regions to the main
transport networks.
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TABLE 1
Regional/Commuter Airlines and Air Taxi/Charter Carriers in the EU, 1993
Number of carriers
a Number of aircraft
b Average number of
aircraft per carrier
Belgium 26 69 2.7
Denmark 26 133 5.1
France 93 397 4.3
Germany 124 356 2.9
Greece 7 30 4.3
Ireland 5 18 3.6
Italy 42 134 3.2
Luxembourg 3 7 2.3
Netherlands 18 59 3.3
Portugal 15 38 2.5
Spain 27 82 3.0
UK 86 276 3.2
Total 472 1,599 3.4
a Total number of commuter airlines and air taxi/charter carriers in EU states in 1993 (does not include training
or airphoto carriers, nor helicopter operators).
b Total number of aircraft registered for carriers.
Source: JP Airline Fleet International, 1994.
The EU commuter carrier sector is clearly at an earlier stage of development.
This sector has the potential to offer vital links to the main EU transport
networks, particularly for small and peripheral communities. But the carriers
need to build up their networks in order to avail of economies of scope and to
complement the services of the larger carriers. At this stage, the networks are
nationally focused and competition with national or other EU flag carriers is
difficult. The US experience has shown that the commuter carrier sector plays an
increasingly more important role in linking small communities and offering
consumers attractive scheduling and pricing arrangements.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the European Union, air transport can play a somewhat different role from the
one it played in the past. The European airline networks of the 1940s, 1950s and
1960s were focused on developing and expanding links with each state and the
main international centres in Europe, the US and, to a lesser extent, Asia and
Australasia. Accordingly, the flag carrier networks were focused on one or two
main national hub airports (usually the capital city). In this situation, feederFiscal Studies
72
services from the regional centres within the state fed traffic to the main hub
airport(s) or connected regional centres within the state in the larger domestic
markets of Germany, France and the UK. With the advent of the Single
European Market, much attention is now being focused on developing inter-
regional links (particularly in border areas) and intra-regional links that connect
to the Trans-European Networks (TENs). These networks are the strategically
important corridors serving the EU, and have been drawn up at the ‘federal’
level. Because of the awkward geography of the EU, much of the Union’s land
area is peripheral to the main population and economic core. In this context, air
transport should be reconsidered in terms of the potential role that it can play in
linking peripheral regions to the TENs and the EU’s core. In addition, inter-
regional interactions between bordering states can be developed relatively
quickly with air transport.
A vibrant commuter carrier sector with access to all classes of Community air
routes offers flexibility in developing new links between and within EU regions.
It has been shown how the commuter carriers in the US became increasingly
important in this role after deregulation. Deregulation led to a rationalisation of
markets and of carriers so that, for example, a higher service frequency to many
small and medium-sized communities was achieved. US commuter carrier code-
sharing agreements with larger carriers is an important factor which has greatly
enhanced the number of origin–destination pairs a given airline can offer to
passengers within its own system.
Air transport requires relatively small infrastructural investments in order to
link small centres to larger centres and networks. Air carriers can offer flexible,
convenient and cost-effective service when the market is competitive and
operates with minimal restrictions. The EU liberalisation package does not
address the role and potential of smaller air carriers in the single market and
accordingly does not attempt to redefine the role of air transport in linking
smaller centres in the much larger European Union. The US view was succinctly
stated in the 1993 report to the President and Congress, Change, Challenge and
Competition (National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline
Industry, 1993), when it recommended the development of policies encouraging
services to small communities, including the maintenance of the federal EAS
programme. The report concluded that
If the nation’s economy is to be competitive in the new century, our communities must be
able to reach markets for their goods and products, wherever those markets may exist....
Convenient access to airline service is essential for the economic growth and development
of small communities. Connecting these small communities to the national air
transportation system provides economic benefit to the nation as a whole.
(National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, 1993, p. 27.)European Air Transport PSOs
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In Sections II and III, it was shown that EU liberalisation legislation includes
some provision for low-density routes or small-community routes where state
subsidies may be paid to carriers in order to guarantee a minimum level of air
services. There are difficulties with the legislation, however, which may
adversely affect the regional airports and may produce a suboptimal outcome for
the EU because subsidy payments may not be minimised. This may result
because non- national carriers tendering for PSO routes must have an established
interstate capacity in operation or they must be prepared to produce interstate
capacity as well as domestic capacity in order to be eligible for the service
obligation. The EU legislation is not clear on how periodic downturns in small-
community traffic levels, which may occur in parallel with unfavourable national
economic conditions, can be quickly dealt with, so that a ‘safety net’ for small-
community air services is kept in place. Increases in the service levels offered by
carriers fulfilling PSOs are not catered for in the legislation either.
EU liberalisation is expected to bring net benefits to the member states. The
approach is to deal with the air transport sector at the EU level. The Commission
is now strongly advocating a common external aviation policy, where the
Commission negotiates or renews bilateral agreements with non-EU states. In the
area of air traffic control, again the aim is to centralise and harmonise and
administer a Union-wide system. However, in terms of dealing with essential air
services to peripheral or small communities, the Commission approach has been
to leave administration and funding up to individual states. The subsidiarity
principle should be re-examined in this case. For consistency, this aspect of the
EU’s air transport policy should also be administered and funded at the EU level
if efficiency, transparency and balanced regional development are core concerns.
A more flexible approach will help small-community airports to establish
stronger passenger bases and ensure air services even in cyclical downturns.
Under these circumstances, the benefits of fast access to peripheral regions will
accrue to the regions and to the EU as a whole.
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